Fictional names, rigidity, and the inverse-Sinatra principle

For those familiar with Saul Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* lectures, the notion of rigidity needs no introduction. But what is the inverse-Sinatra principle? Frank Sinatra sang about New York: "If I can make it there, I'll make it anywhere". According to the inverse-Sinatra principle, the following holds for a broad class of proper names, which includes names that refer (or referred) to a concrete object in the actual world (like 'Leo Tolstoy') as well as fictional names (like 'Anna Karenina'): if the name can't make it here, it won't make it anywhere. For example, if the name doesn't manage to refer to a concrete, spatiotemporal object here, in the actual world, it doesn't refer to a concrete, spatiotemporal object with respect to other possible worlds either. In my talk, I aim to show that the inverse-Sinatra principle is, in several ways, a missing puzzle piece in a comprehensive Kripkean account of proper names. First, it's the other side of the rigidity thesis (which, on one formulation, states that if a name refers to an object here, in the actual world, then it refers to that object everywhere, in all possible worlds). Second, the principle provides an appealing way to extend to fictional names Kripke's picture about causal-historical chains of use determining the reference of names like 'Tolstoy'. Third, several fiction-related remarks by Kripke (brief comments in his 1972/1980 and the extended discussion in his 1973/2013) point toward the need to locate the inverse-Sinatra principle as a missing puzzle piece.

Kripke, S. (1972/1980). "Naming and Necessity". In: D. Davidson & G. Harman (eds.), *Semantics of Natural Language*, 2nd edition. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 253–355. Reprinted with Preface, *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980.

Kripke, S. (1973/2013). *Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures for 1973*. New York: Oxford University Press.